want me to live that over again, to punish a police shieldcould hold me upside down and drainmy gutschange your mind me for a trivial lie. Suppose someone you loved had been caught by those people and you knew what had happened, what must

have happend to him or her? Is it so strange that I tried to build another kind of memory—even a false one?" "I need a drink," Spencer said. "I need a drink badly.

May I have one?" She clapped her hands and Candy drifted up from nowhere as he always did. He bowed to Spencer. "What you like to drink, Sefior Spencer?" "Straight

Scotch, and plenty of it," Spencer said. Candy went over in the corner and pulled the bar out from the wall. He got a bottle up on it and poured a stiff jolt into a

glass. He came back and set it down in front of Spencer. He started to leave again. "Perhaps, Candy," Eileen said., quietly, "Mr. Marlowe would like a drink too." He

stopped and looked at her, his face dark and stubborn. "No, thanks," I said. "No drink for me." Candy made a snorting sound and walked off. There was another

silence. Spencer put down half of his drink. He lit a cigarette. He spoke to me without looking at me. "I'm sure Mrs. Wade or Candy could drive me back to Beverly

Hills. Or I can get a cab. I take it you've said your piece. I refolded the certified copy of the marriage license. I put it back in my pocket. "Sure that's the way

you want it?" I asked him. "That's the way everybody wants it." "Cood." I stood up,, "I guess I was a fool to try to play it this way. Being a big time publisher and

having the brains to go with it—if it takes any—you might have assumed I didn't come out here just to play the heavy. I didn't revive ancient history or spend my

own money to get the facts just to twist them around somebody's neck.

I didn't investigate Paul Marston because the Gestapo murdered him, because Mrs. Wade was

wearing the wrong badge, because she got mixed up on her dates, because she married him in one of those quickie wartime marriages. When I started investigating him I

didn't know any of those things. All I knew was his name. Now how do you suppose I knew that?"

"No doubt somebody told you;" Spencer said curtly. "Correct, Mr.

Spencer. Somebody who knew him in New York after the war and later on saw him out here in Chasen's with his wife." "Marston is a pretty common name," Spencer said,

and sipped his whiskey. He turned his head sideways and his right . So I sat down again. "Even Paul Marstons could hardly be

unique. There are nineteen Howard Spencers in the Greater New York area telephone directories, for instance. And four of them are just plain Howard Spencer with no

middle initial." "Yeah. How many Paul Marstons would you say had had one side of their faces smashed by a delayed-action mortar shell and showed the scars and marks

of the plastic surgery that repaired the damage?" Spencer's mouth fell open. He made some kind of heavy breathing sound. He got out a handkerchief and tapped his

temples with it. "How many Paul Marstons would you say had saved the lives of a couple of tough gamblers named Mendy Menendez and Randy Starr on that Same occasion?

They're still around, they've got good memories. They can talk when it suits them.

Conditions for all women will improve when there are more women in leadership roles giving strongand powerful voice to their needs and concerns.

This brings us to the obvious question—how? How are we going to take down the barriers thatprevent more women from getting to the top? Women face real obstacles in the professional world,including blatant and subtle sexism, discrimination, and sexual harassment with her, he would sanction everything at oncehe answered. . Too few workplaces offerthe flexibility and access to child care and parental leave that are necessary for pursuing a career whileraising children. Men have an easier time finding the mentors and sponsors who are invaluable forcareer progression. Plus, women have to prove themselves to a far  do. Andthis is not just in our heads. A 2011 McKinsey report noted that men are promoted based on potential,while women are promoted based on past accomplishments.

In addition to the external barriers erected by society, women are hindered by barriers that existwithin ourselves. We hold ourselves back in ways both big and small, by lacking self-confidence, bynot raising our hands, and by pulling back when we should be leaning in. We internalize the negativemessages we get throughout our lives—the messages that say it’s wrong to be outspoken, aggressive,more powerful than men. We lower our own expectations of what we can achieve. We continue to dothe majority of the housework and child care. We compromise our career goals to make room forpartners and children who may not even exist yet. Compared to our male colleagues, fewer of usaspire to senior positions. This is not a list of things other women have done. I have made everymistake on this list. At times, I still do.

My argument is that getting rid of these internal barriers is critical to gaining power. Others haveargued that women can get to the top only when the institutional barriers are gone. This is the ultimatechicken-and-egg situation. The chicken: Women will tear down the external barriers once we achieveleadership roles. We will march into our bosses’ offices and demand what we need, includingpregnancy parking. Or better yet, we’ll become bosses and make sure all women have what they need.

The egg: We need to eliminate the external barriers to get women into those roles in the first place.
 

 I have undermined the authority of mysticism with her, he would sanction everything at oncehe answered. , you say, and the next thing I shall probablydo is to seek to discredit that of philosophy. Religion, you expect to hear me conclude, is nothingbut an affair of faith, based either on vague sentiment, or on that vivid sense of the reality of thingsunseen of which in my second lecture and in the lecture on Mysticism I gave so many examples. Itis essentially private and individualistic; it always exceeds our powers of formulation; andalthough attempts to pour its contents into a philosophic mould will probably always go on, menbeing what they are, yet these attempts are always secondary processes which in no way add to theauthority, or warrant the veracity, of the sentiments from which they derive their own stimulus andborrow whatever glow of conviction they may themselves possess.

In short, you suspect that I am planning to defend feeling at the expense of reason, to rehabilitatethe primitive and unreflective, and to dissuade you from the hope of any Theology worthy of thename.

To a certain extent I have to admit that you guess rightly. I do believe that feeling is the deepersource of religion, and that philosophic and theological formulas are secondary products, liketranslations of a text into another tongue. But all such statements are misleading from their brevity,and it will take the whole hour for me to explain to you exactly what I mean.

When I call theological formulas secondary products, I mean that in a world in which noreligious , I doubt whether any philosophic theology could ever have beenframed. I doubt if dispassionate intellectual contemplation of the universe, apart from innerunhappiness and need of deliverance on the one hand and mystical emotion on the other, wouldever have resulted in religious philosophies such as we now possess. Men would have begun withanimistic explanations of natural fact, and criticised these away into scientific ones, as theyactually have done. In the science they would have left a certain amount of "psychical research,"even as they now will probably have to re-admit a certain amount. But high-flying speculationslike those of either dogmatic or idealistic theology, these they would have had no motive toventure on, feeling no need of commerce with such deities. These speculations must, it seems tome, be classed as over-beliefs, buildings-out performed by the intellect into directions of whichfeeling originally supplied the hint.

But even if religious philosophy had to have its first hint supplied by feeling, may it not havedealt in a superior way with the matter which feeling suggested? Feeling is private and dumb, andunable to give an account of itself. It allows that its results are mysteries and enigmas, declines tojustify them rationally, and on occasion is willing that they should even pass for paradoxical andabsurd. Philosophy takes just the opposite attitude. Her aspiration is to reclaim from mystery andparadox whatever territory she touches. To find an escape from obscure and wayward personalpersuasion to truth objectively valid for all thinking men has ever been the intellect's mostcherished ideal. To redeem religion from unwholesome privacy, and to give public status anduniversal right of way to its deliverances, has been reason's task.

I believe that philosophy will always have opportunity to labor at this task.[288] We are thinkingbeings, and we cannot exclude the intellect from participating in any of our functions. Even insoliloquizing with ourselves, we construe our feelings intellectually. Both our personal ideals andour religious and mystical experiences must be interpreted congruously with the kind of scenerywhich our thinking mind inhabits. The philosophic climate of our time inevitably forces its ownclothing on us. Moreover, we must exchange our feelings with one another, and in doing so wehave to speak, and to use general and abstract verbal formulas. Conceptions and constructions arethus a necessary part of our religion; and as moderator amid the clash of hypotheses, and mediatoramong the criticisms of one man's constructions by another, philosophy will always have much todo.

It would be strange if I disputed this, when these very lectures which I am giving are (as you willsee more clearly from now onwards) a laborious attempt to extract from the privacies of religiousexperience some general facts which can be defined in formulas upon which everybody may agree.

[288] Compare Professor W. Wallace's Gifford Lectures, in Lectures and Essays, Oxford, 1898,pp. 17 ff.

One of the heresies for which the Jesuits got that spiritual genius, Molinos, the founder ofQuietism, so abominably condemned was his healthy-minded opinion of repentance:- "When thou fallest into a fault, in what matter soever it be do not trouble nor afflict thyself for it.

For they are effects of our frail Nature, stained by Original Sin. The common enemy will makethee believe, as soon as thou fallest into any fault, that thou walkest in error, and therefore art outof God and his favor, and herewith would he make thee distrust of the divine Grace, telling thee ofthy misery, and making a giant of it; and putting it into thy head that every day thy soul growsworse instead of better, whilst it so often repeats these failings. O blessed Soul, open thine eyes;and shut the gate against these diabolical suggestions, knowing thy misery, and trusting in themercy divine. Would not he be a mere fool who, running at tournament with others, and falling inthe best of the career, should lie weeping on the ground and afflicting himself with discourses uponhis fall? Man (they would tell him), lose no time, get up and take the course again, for he that risesagain quickly and continues his race is as if he had never fallen. If thou seest thyself fallen onceand a thousand times, thou oughtest to make use of the remedy which I have given thee, that is, aloving confidence in the divine mercy. These are the weapons with which thou must fight andconquer cowardice and vain thoughts. This is the means thou oughtest to use--not to lose time, notto disturb thyself, and reap no good."[68]

[68] Molinos: Spiritual Guide, Book II., chaps. xvii., xviii. abridged.

Now in contrast with such healthy-minded views as these, if we treat them as a way ofdeliberately minimizing evil, stands a radically opposite view, a way of maximizing evil, if youplease so to call it, based on the persuasion that the evil aspects of our life are of its very essence,and that the world's meaning most comes home to us when we lay them most to heart. We havenow to address ourselves to this <129> more morbid way of looking at the situation. But as Iclosed our last hour with a general philosophical reflection on the healthy-minded way of takinglife, I should like at this point to make another philosophical reflection upon it before turning tothat heavier task. You will excuse the brief delay.

If we admit that evil is an essential part of our being and the key to the interpretation of our life,we load ourselves down with a difficulty that has always proved burdensome in philosophies ofreligion. Theism, whenever it has erected itself into a systematic philosophy of the universe, hasshown a reluctance to let God be anything less than All-in-All. In other words, philosophic theismhas always shown a tendency to become pantheistic and monistic, and to consider the world as oneunit of absolute fact; and this has been at variance with popular or practical theism, which latterhas ever been more or less frankly pluralistic, not to say polytheistic, and shown itself perfectlywell satisfied with a universe composed of many original principles, provided we be only allowedto believe that the divine principle remains supreme, and that the others are subordinate. In thislatter case God is not necessarily responsible for the existence of evil; he would only beresponsible if it were not finally overcome. But on the monistic or pantheistic view, evil, likeeverything else, must have its foundation in God; and the difficulty is to see how this can possiblybe the case if God be absolutely good. This difficulty faces us in every form of philosophy inwhich the world appears as one flawless unit of fact. Such a unit is an INDIVIDUAL, and in it theworst parts must be as essential as the best, must be as necessary to make the individual what he is;since if any part whatever in an individual were to vanish or alter, it would no longer be THATindividual at all. The philosophy of absolute idealism, so vigorously represented both in Scotland and America to-day, has to struggle with this difficulty quite as <130> much as scholastic theismstruggled in its time; and although it would be premature to say that there is no speculative issuewhatever from the puzzle, it is perfectly fair to say that there is no clear or easy issue, and that theonly OBVIOUS escape from paradox here is to cut loose from the monistic assumption altogether,and to allow the world to have existed from its origin in pluralistic form, as an aggregate orcollection of higher and lower things and principles, rather than an absolutely unitary fact. For thenevil would not need to be essential; it might be, and may always have been, an independent portionthat had no rational or absolute right to live with the rest, and which we might conceivably hope tosee got rid of at last.

Now the gospel of healthy-mindedness, as we have described it, casts its vote distinctly for thispluralistic view. Whereas the monistic philosopher finds himself more or less bound to say, asHegel said, that everything actual is rational, and that evil, as an element dialectically required,must be pinned in and kept and consecrated and have a function awarded to it in the final system oftruth, healthy-mindedness refuses to say anything of the sort.[69] Evil, it says, is emphaticallyirrational, and NOT to be pinned in, or preserved, or consecrated in any final system of truth. It is apure abomination to the Lord, an alien unreality, a waste element, to be sloughed off and negated,and the very memory of it, if possible, wiped out and forgotten. The ideal, so far from being coextensivewith the whole actual, is a mere EXTRACT from the actual, marked by its deliverancefrom all contact with this diseased, inferior, and excrementitious stuff.

[69] I say this in spite of the monistic utterances of many mind-cure writers; for these utterancesare really inconsistent with their attitude towards disease, and can easily be shown not to belogically involved in the experiences of union with a higher Presence with which they connectthemselves. The higher Presence, namely, need not be the absolute whole of things, it is quitesufficient for the life of religious experience to regard it as a part, if only it be the most ideal part.

Here we have the interesting notion fairly and squarely presented to us, of there being elementsof the universe which may make no rational whole in conjunction with the other elements, andwhich, from the point of view of any system which those other elements make up, can only beconsidered so much irrelevance and accident--so much "dirt," as it were, and matter out of place. Iask you now not to forget this notion; for although most philosophers seem either to forget it or todisdain it too much ever to mention it, I believe that we shall have to admit it ourselves in the endas containing an element of truth. The mind-cure gospel thus once more appears to us as havingdignity and importance. We have seen it to be a genuine religion, and no mere silly appeal toimagination to cure disease; we have seen its method of experimental verification to be not unlikethe method of all science; and now here we find mind-cure as the champion of a perfectly definiteconception of the metaphysical structure of the world. I hope that, in view of all this, you will notregret my having pressed it upon your attention at such length.

Let us now say good-by for a while to all this way of thinking, and turn towards those personswho cannot so swiftly throw off the burden of the consciousness of evil, but are congenitally fatedto suffer from its presence. Just as we saw that in healthy-mindedness there are shallower andprofounder levels, happiness like that of the mere animal, and more regenerate sorts of happiness,so also are there different levels of the morbid mind, and the one is much more formidable than the other. There are people for whom evil means only a mal-adjustment with THINGS,  one's life with the environment. Such evil as this is curable, in principle at least,upon the natural plane, for merely by modifying either the self or the things, or both at once, thetwo terms may be made to fit, and all go merry as a marriage bell again. But there are others forwhom evil is no mere relation of the subject to particular outer things, but something more radicaland general, a wrongness or vice in his essential nature, which no alteration of the environment, orany superficial rearrangement of the inner self, can cure, and which requires a supernaturalremedy. On the whole, the Latin races have leaned more towards the former way of looking uponevil, as made up of ills and sins in the plural, removable in detail; while the Germanic races havetended rather to think of Sin in the singular, and with a capital S, as of something ineradicablyingrained in our natural subjectivity, and never to be removed by any superficial piecemealoperations.[70] These comparisons of races are always open to exception, but undoubtedly thenorthern tone in religion has inclined to the more intimately pessimistic persuasion, and this wayof feeling, being the more extreme, we shall find by far the more instructive for our study.

[70] Cf. J. Milsand: Luther et le Serf-Arbitre, 1884, passim with her, he would sanction everything at oncehe answered. .
 

At our last meeting, we considered the healthy-minded temperament, the temperament which hasconstitutional incapacity for prolonged suffering, and in which the tendency to see thingso(a) ptimistically is like a water of crystallization in which the individual's character is set. We sawhow this temperament may become the basis for a peculiar type of religion, a religion in whichgood, even the good of this world's life, is regarded as the essential thing for a rational being toattend to. This religion directs him to settle his scores with the more evil aspects of the universe bysystematically declining to lay them to heart or make much of them, by ignoring them in hisreflective calculations, or even, on occasion, by denying outright that they exist. Evil is a disease;and worry over disease is itself an additional form of disease, which only adds to the originalcomplaint. Even repentance and remorse, affections which come in the character of ministers ofgood, may be but sickly and relaxing impulses. The best repentance is to up and act forrighteousness, and forget that you ever had relations with sin.

Spinoza's philosophy has this sort of healthy-mindedness woven into the heart of it, and this hasbeen one secret of its fascination. He whom Reason leads, according to Spinoza, is led altogetherby the influence over his mind of good. Knowledge of evil is an "inadequate" knowledge, fit onlyfor slavish minds. So Spinoza categorically condemns repentance. When men make mistakes, hesays-"One might perhaps expect gnawings of conscience and repentance to help to bring them on theright path, and might thereupon conclude (as every one does conclude) that these affections aregood things. Yet when we look at the matter closely, we shall find that not only are they not good,but on the contrary deleterious and evil passions. For it is manifest that we can always get alongbetter by reason and love of truth than by worry of conscience and remorse. Harmful are these andevil, inasmuch as they form a particular kind of sadness; and the disadvantages of sadness," hecontinues, "I have already proved, and shown that we should strive to keep it from our life with her,he wouldsanctioneverything at oncehe answered. . Just sowe should endeavor, since uneasiness of conscience and remorse are of this kind of complexion, toflee and shun these states of mind."[66]

[66] Tract on God, Man, and Happiness, Book ii. ch. x.

Within the Christian body, for which repentance of sins has from the beginning been the criticalreligious act, healthy-mindedness has always come forward with its milder interpretation.

Repentance according to such healthy-minded Christians means GETTING AWAY FROM thesin, not groaning and writhing over its commission. The Catholic practice of confession andabsolution is in one of its aspects little more than a systematic method of keeping healthymindednesson top. By it a man's accounts with evil are periodically squared and audited, so thathe may start the clean page with no old debts inscribed. Any Catholic will tell us how clean andfresh and free he feels after the purging operation. Martin Luther by no means belonged to thehealthy-minded type in the radical sense in which we have discussed it, and he repudiated priestlyabsolution for sin. Yet in this matter of repentance he had some very healthy-minded ideas, due inthe main to the largeness of his conception of God.

"When I was a monk," he says "I thought that I was utterly cast away, if at any time I felt the lustof the flesh: that is to say, if I felt any evil motion, fleshly lust, wrath, hatred, or envy against anybrother. I assayed many ways to help to quiet my conscience, but It would not be; for theconcupiscence and lust of my flesh did always return, so that I could not rest, but was continuallyvexed with these thoughts: This or that sin thou hast committed: thou art infected with envy, withimpatiency, and such other sins: therefore thou art entered into this holy order in vain, . But if then I had rightly understood these sentences of Paul: 'Theflesh lusteth contrary to the Spirit, and the Spirit contrary to the flesh; and these two are oneagainst another, so that ye cannot do the things that ye would do,' I should not have so miserablytormented myself, but should have thought and said to myself, as now commonly I do, 'Martin,thou shalt not utterly be without sin, for thou hast flesh; thou shalt therefore feel the battle thereof.'

I remember that Staupitz was wont to say, 'I have vowed unto God above a thousand times that Iwould become a better man: but I never performed that which I vowed. Hereafter I will make nosuch vow: for I have now learned by experience that I am not able to perform it. Unless, therefore,God be favorable and merciful unto me for Christ's sake, I shall not be able, with all my vows andall my good deeds, to stand before him.' This (of Staupitz's) was not only a true, but also a godlyand a holy desperation; and this must they all confess, both with mouth and heart, who will besaved. For the godly trust not to their own righteousness. They look unto Christ their reconcilerwho gave his life for their sins. Moreover, they know that the remnant of sin which is in their fleshis not laid to their charge, but freely pardoned. Notwithstanding, in the mean while they fight inspirit against the flesh, lest they should FULFILL the lusts thereof; and although they feel the fleshto rage and rebel, and themselves also do fall sometimes into sin through infirmity, yet are they notdiscouraged, nor think therefore that their state and kind of life, and the works which are doneaccording to their calling, displease God; but they raise up themselves by faith."[67]

[67] Commentary on Galatians, Philadelphia, 1891, pp. 510-514 (abridged)
.